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12 NOVEMBER 1966

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IMMEDIATE SAIGON

CITE HEADQUARTERS

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1. THE MATTER OF PACIFICATION REORGANIZATION HAS NOW
MOVED CLOSER TO IMPLEMENTATION. HIGHEST LEVEL WASHINGTON
DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO TRY CIVILIAN CONTROL FOR A SHORT TIME
(90-120) DAYS) AND IF THIS DOES NOT WORK, GIVE PACIFICATION AND RD TO
THE MILITARY. AMBASSADOR LODGE IS RECEIVING TELEGRAM FROM
SECSTATE, SECDEF, AND KOMER (STATE IF THIS IS NOT SHOWN
TO YOU ITS GIST IS AS FOLLOWS:

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2. FOREGOING HAS MANY OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR EFFORT. WE WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS ON CERTAIN POINTS WE CONSIDER OF PARAMOUNT SIGNIFICANCE. FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE DELINEATION OF THE EXACT IMPACT THE ABOVE CONCEPT WOULD HAVE ON YOUR COMMAND AND THE COMMAND LINES RUNNING BELOW YOU THROUGH THE REGIONAL OFFICERS. IT SEEMS QUITE CLEAR THAT OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF THE CADRE PROGRAM WILL BE IN AMBASSADOR PORTER'S HANDS AND THAT YOU MUST SATISFY HIM THAT HE HAS THAT DIRECT AUTHORITY. WHETHER YOU CAN RETAIN RESIDUAL PROFESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THESE OPERATIONS ARE EXECUTED WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH AMBASSADOR PORTER. EVEN NOW, OF COURSE, ALL OF YOUR OPERATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO AMBASSADOR PORTER'S OVER-ALL AUTHORITY, BUT THE CONCEPT OUTLINED ABOVE OBVIOUSLY ENVISAGES SOMETHING GOING CONSIDERABLY BEYOND PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS, I. E., A STRUCTURE IN WHICH PORTER AND HIS STAFF WILL HAVE DIRECT CONTROL AND WILL INTEGRATE YOUR CADRE EFFORTS WITH OTHER AGENCIES' WORK IN THE RD FIELD. AT A MINIMUM IT APPEARS THAT THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY [] PROVINCIAL RDC ADVISORS ARE UNDER [] REGIONAL OFFICERS WILL HAVE TO CHANGE AT LEAST TO SOME DEGREE, IF NOT TOTALLY. IN A COMMAND SENSE, THESE PROVINCIAL RDC

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ADVISORS WILL BECOME LINE SUBORDINATES OF AMBASSADOR PORTER'S REGIONAL AND PROVINCE TEAM CHIEFS.

3. WHAT ALL THIS WILL DO TO [REDACTED]

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ACTIVITIES WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. [REDACTED] HAS AGREED TO HAND OVER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE [REDACTED] PROGRAM TO A PACIFICATION CZAR, BUT WOULD PREFER FOR US TO RETAIN CONTROL

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25X1 OVER [REDACTED] AND OTHER RELATED ACTIVITIES IF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT CAN BE AMICABLY WORKED OUT WITH PORTER.

4. IN ANY EVENT, WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE IMPORTANT AND COMPLEX BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS TO SOLVE, PROBLEMS ON WHICH WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR THOUGHTS SOONEST. WE HAVE A MOST COMPLICATED PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES

25X1 SINCE [REDACTED] MUST RETAIN A COMMAND LINE RELATIONSHIP OVER THE

25X1 EXPENDITURE OF [REDACTED] FUNDS IN ORDER TO FULFILL HIS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE LEGISLATION WHICH APPROPRIATED THEM.

25X1 ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT IGNORE [REDACTED] STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES AND BELIEVE WE MUST PRESERVE COMMAND INTEGRITY OVER THOSE PROGRAMS FOR WHICH WE REMAIN RESPONSIBLE, WE ALSO FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE MUST ENTER ENTIRELY AND WHOLEHEARTEDLY INTO THE ROLE OF SUPPORTING AMBASSADOR PORTER AND ASSISTING HIM IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS NEW RESPONSIBILITIES.

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5. A VERY IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THIS LAST POINT IS THE TYPE
25X1 OF STAFF ASSISTANCE [] CAN PROVIDE TO PORTER'S NEW
ORGANIZATION. IT IS CLEAR THAT IF WASHINGTON IS NOT SATISFIED
WITH RESULTS OBTAINED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE UNDER THE NEW
CIVILIAN STRUCTURE, THE ENTIRE RD PROGRAM WILL BE PLACED
UNDER MILITARY DIRECTION. AS YOU KNOW, WE SHARE YOUR SERIOUS
DOUBTS WHETHER COMUSMACV WITH ALL ITS OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES
AND WITH THE APPROACH OF A ^{LARGE} ~~LARGE~~ MILITARY UNIT CAN, IN FACT,
MANAGE A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. IF
PORTER IS TO SUCCEED, IT APPEARS TO US THAT HE REQUIRES A VERY
STRONG STAFF AND SHOULD HAVE AT HIS DISPOSAL AT LEAST ONE
25X1 SENIOR [] OFFICER WHOM HE KNOWS AND TRUSTS AND WHO CAN
PROVIDE HIM WITH THE NECESSARY "STIFFENING" WITHOUT WHICH HE IS
UNLIKELY TO EXERCISE TRUE COMMAND. WE ARE NOT YET PREPARED
TO NOMINATE SUCH AN OFFICER AND WOULD WELCOME YOUR SUGGESTIONS.

6. ONE OF THE MAJOR TASKS ON WHICH YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO
HELP PORTER WOULD BE THE PREPARATION OF SPECIFIC PROGRAMS FOR
PACIFICATION IN AT LEAST A FEW SELECTED AREAS. THESE WOULD BE
PILOT MODELS OF TYPES OF PROGRAMS WHICH COULD THEN BE DEVELOPED
IN OTHER DISTRICTS AND PROVINCES. THESE SHOULD BE VERY SPECIFIC
EXERCISES AIMED AT PARTICULAR PIECES OF GEOGRAPHY IN WHICH THE
VARIOUS STAGES OF PACIFICATION, THE ASSETS NECESSARY AND THE ACTION

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AGENCY'S RESPONSIBILITY ARE ALL PLAINLY DELINEATED. THUS A PLAN FOR CERTAIN DISTRICT WOULD DESCRIBE THE ARVN TROOPS NEEDED, THEIR REQUIRED CHAIN OF COMMAND, THE RF PF, ETC., WHICH WOULD HAVE TO EXIST, THE RDC CADRE AND ITS GEOGRAPHIC ASSIGNMENTS, THE AID AND OTHER MINISTRY SUPPORT WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE PLAN. ALL OF THIS WOULD BE PHRASED AND SET FORTH IN THE MOST CONSERVATIVE MANNER POSSIBLE WITH A CLEAR CHECKLIST FOR DIFFERENT STAGES IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE WHAT ELEMENT OF THE TOTAL PROGRAM FAILED TO CARRY OUT ITS FUNCTIONS. WITH A FEW OF THESE SPECIFIC AND LOCALIZED EXERCISES AS PILOT SAMPLES, BROADER PROGRAMMING COULD BECOME MORE REALISTIC. THE RESULTS COULD THEN BE GAUGED AGAINST A STANDARD SYSTEM OF MEASUREMENT (E.G., THE GRID DISCUSSED IN STATE TELEGRAM [REDACTED]). THIS ASSESSMENT SHOULD TELL US WHICH ELEMENTS OF THE PACIFICATION/RD PROGRAM WORK AND WHICH DO NOT.

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7. ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS, OF COURSE, FOR YOUR EYES ONLY AT THE PRESENT TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

Coordinated in draft with:

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